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Abstract 
 
While western foreign correspondence is retreating, Chinese central media and 
correspondents, bestowed by the government’s financial backing for media’s role in public 
diplomacy, are taking the opportunities to expand overseas bureaus, hire experienced local 
employees, enhance the quantity and quality of international news reporting, use digital 
technologies in newsgathering and dissemination, and receive western-style trainings.  
Against this backdrop this paper studies the identities, media cultures and journalistic 
practices of Chinese foreign correspondents as well as the international news output, media-
audience and media-foreign policy relationship.  In doing so we propose a new theoretical 
model with six levels - (1) journalists’ identities; (2) cultures; (3) practices; (4) news output; 
(5) news dissemination, reception and audiences’ interactions, and (6) the impacts of 
international news coverage. Based on semi-structured interviews with Chinese resident 
journalists over seven years, we argue that the media-audience and media-foreign policy 
relationship in China have become more interactive, dynamic and complex.   
 
Key words: Foreign correspondents, China, identity, media culture, journalistic practice, 
audience, foreign policy 
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Introduction 
Foreign correspondence, as a profession closely linked to the unprecedented changes in 
modern journalism, deserves more attention from media scholars. Foreign correspondents set 
the international agenda (Willnat and Martin 2012), act as the principal source of information 
from far-flung lands (Sambrook 2010), and serve a public purpose in bearing witness to 
major events through eyewitness reporting (ibid). However, studies on foreign 
correspondence suffer from two limitations.   
Firstly, much of the research on foreign correspondents and their work has centered on 
foreign press corps in and from the EU countries and the USA.  It leads to the view that 
foreign correspondence is in a state of retreat, decline and/or crisis (e.g., Hamilton 2009; 
Sambrook 2010). It believes that driven by economic pressures, globalization or global 
interdependence, technological innovations (Hamilton and Jenner 2004; Sambrook 2010) and 
market demands (Altmeppen 2010; Hess 1996), this downward trend gives rise to the 
unintended and unwanted consequence -- the news media is unable to uncover evolving 
crises and provide in-depth and reliable background reporting, which is problematic for 
conflict prevention (Otto and Meyer 2012).  Other scholars challenge this orthodox view.  
“All of the talk of extinction is, in fact, exaggerated,” argue Hamilton and Jenner (2004). 
They believe what the trends really show is that mass media are unlikely to increase the 
number of foreign correspondents they send abroad but, instead, will look for cost-saving 
alternatives such as dispatching parachute foreign correspondents (ibid). Sambrook (2010) 
also argues that foreign correspondents are by no means redundant. Instead they will be very 
different from their predecessors and work in very different ways to serve the digital news 
environment of 21st century. He believes eyewitness reporting at the heart of international 
journalism has been and will remain of crucial importance but in the digital news world it can 
be achieved in ways different from the traditional. Archetti’s study (2013) of foreign 
correspondents in London goes further in suggesting that foreign correspondence is indeed 
evolving, but for the better rather than for the worse. They pursue exclusive news angles and 
deliver fuller values with the use of new communication technologies.  In spite of the 
disagreement, both are West-centered and ignore the changes in developing countries, which 
will have long-term consequences for the global flow of information and the character of 
public debate (Sambrook 2010). Take China for an example.  In contrast to what is happening 
to the West, Chinese foreign correspondent networks are undergoing an explosive expansion 
(ibid). Because of China’s “going global” strategy, the government has invested US$6 billion 
on state media (or central media) (Zhang 2013). Recipients of this funding include Xinhua 
News Agency (Xinhua), China Central Television (CCTV), People’s Daily, China Radio 
International (CRI) and China Daily (Shambaugh 2013, 227).  The official websites of the 
four news outlets show that by June 2016 Xinhua has 180 overseas bureaus; CCTV  63;  
People’s Daily  39 , CRI  32,  and China Daily  more than 40. In addition, many of the 
market-oriented media outlets in China have dispatched abroad reporters, the so-called 
“parachute correspondents”, to cover major international news events in order to sustain and 
enhance their competitiveness in the domestic market (Zhang 2013).  
More importantly, these studies suffer from the lack of an inclusive model that has the power 
to explain the work and role perceptions which should work in today’s changing media 
environment marked by digitalization and globalization. A more integrative theory of 
“journalism culture” is much needed (Willnat and Martin 2012).  
In filling the identified gaps this paper proposes a new framework in the study of foreign 
correspondents. It then applies the framework to the case of China.  In filling an important 
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missing link in scholarly literature through a new theoretical framework and empirical rigour, 
we thus address the much understudied question of foreign correspondence in other parts of 
the world on the one hand and make important steps towards theorisation on the study of 
foreign correspondents on the other.    
A new framework to study foreign correspondents 
 
In building a framework to study the up-to-date status of foreign correspondents, we draw on 
Stephen Hess’s (2005) three questions essential in understanding journalists – who are the 
correspondents?  How do they work? What do they report? As foreign correspondence is 
understood to influence the world public opinion and the foreign policy making process, we 
propose to add a fourth dimension: “What are their reports’ impacts?” On the basis of these 
four questions, a new framework is proposed below to study the contemporary foreign 
correspondents.  
 
 
Figure 1: A new model to study contemporary foreign correspondents 
As Figure 1 indicates, we propose to study foreign correspondents from six levels.  On the 
left side of the diagram, journalists’ identities, media cultures and practices are the focuses of 
study that are meant to answer the questions of “who are they?” and “how do they work?”. 
On the right side, the three focuses are news output, news dissemination, reception and 
audiences’ interactions, and the impacts of international news coverage. They are meant to 
answer the questions of “what do they report?” and “what are the impacts of their reports?”  
Below we will discuss each level in more detail.  
 
Who are they? 
Correspondents’ identities including their demographic profiles, professional backgrounds, 
motivations and role perceptions are examined to reveal who they are. Only by knowing who 
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they are, what drives them to be a foreign correspondent and how they perceive their roles 
can we understand their cultures, practices and impacts of their work. This is therefore one of 
the main areas researchers focus on. For instance, Hess (2005) conducted a comprehensive 
survey of 439 foreign correspondents in 1999 and found that the number of foreign 
correspondents in the US increased greatly in the second half of the 20th century. The 
average foreign correspondent was 42 years old and they had been posted in the US for about 
four years. Full-time male correspondents outnumbered female correspondents three to one. 
Archetti (2013) found that foreign correspondents in London are younger people who are 
working alongside a few veterans. They understand their role as explaining what events in a 
foreign country actually mean. 
Cultures 
This level of exploration focuses on the societal, political and organizational values and 
cultures. Specifically ideology/societal values, national interests/foreign policies, rotation 
system/parachutists, tensions between headquarters and overseas bureaus, as well as the 
budget and financing sources are addressed.  Examinations of the macro context and media 
cultures are essential. Willnat and Martin (2012) point out that researchers need to foster a 
more sophisticated understanding of foreign correspondents’ work based on cultural 
differences in press systems, the media climate as well as political systems and national 
cultures that influence journalists’ roles and reporting methods. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) 
also include organization level, extra-media level, and ideological level in their influence 
model to examine factors that affect media content. After all, “when covering international 
events, media construct the meanings in ways that are compatible with the culture and the 
dominant ideology of societies they serve” (Gurevitch et al. 1991, 206).  Within the news 
organizations, there is a distinctive culture in foreign correspondence that informs the 
behavior of all involved – news organizations, staff reporters, and stringers (Hess 1996, 47). 
The journalistic culture is manifested in the hierarchy of prestige, the patterns of assignments 
and job changes, management and editorial practices, the personalities the business 
encourages, and the particular problems the organizations and their personnel face (ibid).  
Journalistic practices  
Correspondents’ news values (news worthiness), routine work (their daily practice), news 
sources and access to these sources, constraints they encounter, as well as the usage of digital 
technology are examined at this level. Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz’s study (2002) of foreign 
correspondence examined the everyday practices of correspondents, the constraints, and the 
leeway for maneuver and initiative and revealed important insights on the classic question of  
“how to strike the proper balance between structure and agency” (ibid). Archetti (2013) found 
that the correspondents’ everyday practice, in the context of a proliferation of sources, 
audience segmentation, and opportunities for collaborative and non-linear newsgathering, is 
variegated and diverse. In addition, communication technology advances not only have an 
impact on a journalist’s everyday routine, but are also creatively appropriated by reporters for 
newsgathering purposes (ibid). 
 
International news output 
The debate on convergence or divergence of foreign news is still on.  Scholars commonly 
believe foreign news tends to be reported in divergent ways, reflecting the interests and 
identity of the home nation. But such a statement is challenged by recent studies that argue 
for global conformity driven by forces such as dominance of a small number of international 
news agencies, the emergence of a transnational journalistic culture and the hegemony of 
market liberal thought (Curran et al. 2015). Despite the debate, domestication is an essential 
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process in world news coverage.  “Domesticating the foreign” means delivering foreign 
events in a way comprehensible and relevant to domestic audiences (Gurevitch et al 1991). 
The process of “domestication” indicates the dichotomies of a tendency featuring both 
“universal” and “particular”, “convergence” and “diversity” aspects. As Biltereyst (2001, 48) 
argues, “foreign items tend to be marginalized, domesticated, personalized and made 
relevant” in order to cope with the declining audience’s interests and increasing competition. 
At the micro level, foreign correspondents frame news, i.e. selecting and organizing news 
texts and photos to convey a story line. Framing and priming information is an inevitable and 
necessary process (Clausen 2003).  
 
News dissemination, reception and audience interactions  
Technological innovations have facilitated the dissemination of international news from 
diverse sources via multiple platforms – mass media, new media and social media. New 
media technologies have the potential to “bring brand new, even improved ways, to inform 
citizens of the world about the world” (Hamilton & Lawrence 2010). The way foreign news 
is reported and consumed has been changed (Hamilton & Jenner 2004). Audiences have 
unprecedented access to international news through the Internet and 24-hour news channels 
but those who rely on online news aggregators may encounter the same news stories from the 
same dominant media organizations. Only the most engaged and interested consumers of 
online news will encounter foreign news that is not produced by leading media 
conglomerates (Willnat and Martin 2012). The role of audience has also changed from being 
monolithic, generalized and passive in the past to being fragmented and active now. The 
audience is “far better able to choose and even shape the news” (Hamilton & Jenner 2004). 
 
Impacts  
Previous studies have demonstrated that exposure to foreign news has an impact in setting at 
least part of the public agenda, and on attitudes and opinions concerning foreign countries 
(Goodrum, Godo, & Hayter, 2011).  In addition, media is a controlling, constraining, 
intervening or instrumental actor in the policy making process (Gilboa, 2002). The debate 
surrounding the CNN effect – meaning news, especially visual news, can influence and drive 
foreign policy that leads to the Western countries’ humanitarian interventions – is still on. 
Supporters argue that media impact is profound and it has transformed foreign policymaking 
and world politics (e.g. Shaw, 1996). Skeptics suggest that the CNN effect has not changed 
the media–government interaction and the CNN effect has been exaggerated. But nearly all 
scholars acknowledge that the media is an actor in international politics.  
To conclude, the new model can be used to delineate a comprehensive and up-to-date status 
of contemporary foreign correspondents and to address related issues and debates today. In 
the following section, this model will be applied to the case of China to answer the questions 
below: 
Q1: Who are the Chinese foreign correspondents today? 
Q2: What are the media cultures that influence Chinese correspondents’ work? 
Q3: How do the Chinese correspondents cover international news? 
Q4: What are the impacts of the Chinese correspondents’ news reports? 
 
Methods 
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Qualitative approach is employed drawing on evaluation of secondary literatures and 
empirical research based on semi-structured interviews.  A total of 17 interviews were 
conducted with resident correspondents based in the Middle East, Africa and London from 
2007 to 2014.  The majority of interviewees work at Xinhua and CCTV. All interviews were 
conducted face to face and each interview lasted an average of one hour. All the interviewees 
are anonymous. We acknowledge the small number of interviews and thus do not claim a 
general view about Chinese correspondents. However, we believe that our findings offer a 
good starting point for further study on Chinese overseas correspondence.  
 
Identities 
Regarding Chinese correspondents’ demographic profiles, Jiang and Chen (2015) conducted 
an email-based survey among Chinese foreign correspondents to evaluate the status-quo and 
effects of Chinese correspondents’ participation in China’s public diplomacy efforts. Their 
survey covered the period from the end of November to the mid-December 2014. It yielded 
41 valid samples. Respondents include those from Xinhua, CCTV, CRI, People’s Daily, 
Zhejiang TV Station and The Economic Daily, and The First Finance Weekly. More than half 
of the reporters acted as staff correspondents who had resided in two or more foreign 
countries. Other details are listed in Table 1 below: 
Gender Male Proportion Female Proportion Male/Female 
No. of 
respondents 
24 59% 17 41% 1.4:1 
Residence 
term 
1-5 years 6-10 years >11 years   
No. of 
respondents 
23 13 5   
Journalistic 
experiences 
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years >21 years 
No. of 
respondents 
2 (5%) 12 (29%) 7 (17%) 16 (39%) 4 (10%) 
 
Table 1: Chinese foreign correspondents’ demographic profiles generated from the 2014 
survey by Jiang & Chen (2015). (N=41) 
Table 1 indicates that there are more male correspondents than female correspondents. The 
majority of correspondents resided in foreign countries for less than 10 years. Most 
correspondents have journalistic experiences of six to twenty years. However what was 
absent in this survey were correspondents’ age and their education background. The number 
of respondents (N=41) in the survey is also limited. 
Demographic profiles of interviewees in this research are indicated in Table 2 below. 
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Age 25-30 yrs 
old 
31-39 yrs old 40–49 yrs 
old 
50-59 yrs old >60 yrs old 
No. of 
respondents 
3 11 1 
 
0 2 
Gender Male Proportion Female Proportion M/F 
No. of 
respondents 
12 71% 5 29% 2.4:1 
Residence 
term 
1-5 years 6-10 years >11 years   
No. of 
respondents 
14 1 2   
Journalistic 
experiences 
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years >21 years 
No. of 
respondents 
2 7 5 1 2 
 
Table 2: Chinese foreign correspondents’ demographic profiles based on the interviews from 
2007 to 2014  (N=17) 
Table 2 demonstrates some similarities and differences with Table 1.  The similarities are that 
there are more male correspondents than female correspondents. The majority of 
correspondents resided in foreign countries for less than 10 years (1-5 years in particular in 
Table 2). Differences lie in the fact that correspondents’ journalistic experiences are 
spreading over the scale ranging from 2 years to more than 20 years. In addition, Table 2 
shows that most resident correspondents are young people in their late 20s and 30s.  They 
work alongside with the veterans at some outposts. In terms of educational background, most 
interviewees have a BA and even a MA degree in journalism or a foreign language, and/or 
international relations. They have the language facilities and knowledge about the countries 
they reside in. Most of them grow fond of the culture and people in the country they reside.  
Putting the results from Table 1 and Table 2 together, the sketch of a typical Chinese foreign 
correspondent is a male correspondent in his 30s who has worked in journalism profession 
for about 10 years. He has resided in foreign countries for about 5 years.  He can speak 
English quite well and he may also have a degree in a second foreign language such as 
Arabic or a degree in International Relations. The young journalists tend to have a 
cosmopolitan outlook. This finding coincides with Gagliardone & Pál (2016) who find that 
Chinese correspondents in Africa are a cosmopolitan group who tend to be young, fluent in 
English, and sometimes foreign-trained. Many are well travelled and display an interest in 
foreign ways of living but their reporting is not very different from reporting produced by 
those before them (ibid). 
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What motivates Chinese correspondents to work overseas? For war correspondents, a 
subcategory of foreign correspondents, Zhang (2013) finds that the motivating forces include 
curiosity, adventure, fascination with exotic history and culture, life-experience enrichment, 
fierce market competition, audiences’ increasing demands, a sense of duty, and state interests. 
Further interviews by the authors also show that they consider working overseas an important 
step in moving upward on their career path.  Generally speaking, excitement, the desire to use 
the language skills, quicker upward mobility in their career and the knowledge of the local 
culture and history in the host country/region are the main factors that influence the 
journalists’ decision to work as foreign correspondents.  For instance, a 27-year-old male 
correspondent who has worked at Xinhua for 5 years after obtaining his BA degree in Arabic 
in China explained why he worked at the Israeli-Palestine bureau for two years as below:   
 
“After I joined Xinhua for one year, I was posted to the Middle East General Bureau in 
Egypt as an editor. My ideal is to be an international news reporter. I volunteered to go to 
the conflict zones. Thus I was assigned to Gaza. The chief correspondent at the Gaza 
bureau was a 37-year-old female editor who also studied Arabic. Palestine-Israel was the 
most well-known conflict zone.  I wanted to experience it.  (Personal communication, 
2014) 
Regarding the role perceptions, previous work (Zhang, 2013) and more recent interviews find 
that Chinese correspondents perceive their complex mix of roles as objective reporter, 
interpreter, propagandist, diplomat and information gatherer. They downplay the critical and 
participant roles due to their lack of comprehensive knowledge of the complex situation and 
China’s nonparticipation in overseas conflicts. Jiang & Chen (2015)’s research finds that 
90% correspondents recognize that they play the main role in China’s public diplomacy 
initiatives and explaining a true China to the foreign public. They believe the foreign public 
has cognitive deviation towards China. For instance, “foreigners believe that China today is 
still the same as in the 1970s”, and that “Uyghur Muslims received unfair treatment”. “They 
ask why Chinese eat dog meat, monkey brains and insects” and “why China dominates South 
China sea”; and “why China sells fake medicines to Africa”. In these cases, the majority of 
Chinese correspondents would explain what they see as the real situation (ibid).  
Jiang & Chen (2015)’s survey also shows that while 37% respondents provided evidences 
that they participated in the government-level public diplomacy activities, 63% respondents 
think they have never participated in the government-sponsored public diplomacy activities. 
Some correspondents even believe it is the government officials’ responsibilities to practice 
public diplomacy and they are “busy with news reporting and have no time to attend to other 
affairs. The primary task for a correspondent is news reporting”. The survey demonstrates 
that “the foreign correspondents as a community have different perceptions towards their 
involvement in the public diplomacy activities” (Jiang & Chen, 2015).  
Working for national level overseas media outlets also means correspondents work for the 
government to gather local information.  While working for CCTV in Europe in 2007, for 
instance, one interviewee informed the researchers that he would go to Greece to investigate 
how the Olympic Games was hosted , what lessons were to be learned, etc.  They work very 
closely with the Chinese Embassies in the resident countries for information gathering.   
Hence it is fair to say that Chinese foreign correspondents partly perceive their roles as 
objective reporter, which is no different from their western counterparts.  What makes 
Chinese correspondents distinctive is that they also play the roles of propagandist, 
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information gatherer and (cultural) diplomat by propagating and explaining China’s domestic 
and foreign policies as well as participating in China’s public diplomacy activities and 
promoting understanding about China among the foreign public.    
Cultures 
In this section, both the macro-level media cultures including media system, ideology and 
national interests (foreign policy) and the meso-level newsroom cultures including rotation 
system, newsroom tensions and finance will be addressed.  
All media organizations in China were state organs until the reform period started in the late 
1970s and gathered momentum in early 1990s (Hadland & Zhang, 2012).  Since the late 
1980s, Chinese media have undergone commercialization, globalization and 
professionalization processes. Institutionally journalism reform involves “the introduction of 
market forces into news operations without a fundamental change in the communist political 
system” (Pan 2000). Journalists play the dual roles of propaganda and profit-making. On one 
hand, they are professionals, as reflected by the required training and the criteria for 
professional excellence. On the other, they are “party propagandists” and required to toe the 
party line. The Chinese media have undergone transformations from being a state 
propagandistic vehicle only to also “serving the interests of the global as well as the local 
audiences”; and from a state-owned media institution to “a media of capitalistic body with 
socialist characteristics”. (Wu & Ng, 2011) 
 
In terms of ideology and values, Pan (2000) states that the center of China’s party-press 
system is constituted by the “central value system” of communist ideology and the apparatus 
that enforces it. After the reform and opening up policy was established in the late 1970s, the 
Chinese government continued to immerse itself in the ideology of the Cold War, even after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (Zhang 2012). Since the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003, the Chinese government recognised the importance of 
information transparency in effective governance and image building, hence it changed from 
the anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism rhetoric to that of “mutual benefits”, “cooperation” 
and “joint efforts” when speaking to foreign media (ibid). In October 2009, former President 
Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the World Media Summit in Beijing emphasising “Asian 
Values” of social harmony, partnership, concern for welfare over rights and respect for 
authority (Sambrook 2010). There is a continuing clash between Asian values and Western 
values. Where the Asian media is a project of the state and largely expected to promote social 
stability, Western media is expected to hold power to account. Human and civil rights simply 
do not hold the same position in Chinese culture or media as they do in the West (ibid). 
 
Chinese foreign correspondents have the tradition of playing a diplomatic role and fulfilling 
the mission of serving the national interests. Even today, “the news media in China are 
instruments of the government and foreign news are an extension of its foreign policy” (Lin, 
Lo, & Wang, 2011). Zhang (2013) also argues that upholding China’s state interests overseas 
is justified and highlighted in journalists’ news coverage even though it leads to news bias. 
So what are exactly China’s national interests? And what are the major changes in China’s 
foreign policies in recent years?  
 
China’s relationship with other countries would no longer be decided by ideology 
(socialism/capitalism), but rather by national interests (Chen 2005). In recent years, the 
concept of “national interests” in China has expanded from security (domestic and external) 
interests to include “development interests” (Zhang 2015) and “individual Chinese citizens’ 
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interests” (Chen 2005). According to China’s 2011 Peaceful Development White Paper, 
China’s core national interests are defined as “state sovereignty, national security, territorial 
integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution 
and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and 
social development” (Chen 2005). After Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, China’s 
foreign policy has entered a new phase of “peaceful rise 2.0” featuring a more purposeful and 
assertive pursuit of China’s national interests whilst seeking to maintain a peaceful external 
environment. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed, safeguarding “offshore China”, 
China’s growing overseas economic presence that forms an important part of Chinese 
national interests, is becoming a core task of China’s foreign policy.  In addition, Chinese 
government has placed a greater emphasis on the promotion of the overseas interests of 
individual Chinese citizens.  It has developed a new doctrine, the so-called “human-based 
diplomacy” (人本外交), to protect Chinese citizens’ rights and interests abroad (ibid).  
 
For Chinese correspondents, their main job is to uphold China’s state interests and keep their 
news reporting in line with China’s foreign policy.  China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hold 
regular press conference each week and informs media organisations of the “publicity 
guidelines” (宣传口径) on major international events. Such guidelines or principles are 
embedded in the official media’s editorial policies and implemented via censorship and self-
censorship.  
  
“It is clear that no matter which organisation you work for, a western or eastern 
media, Chinese or American media, you are under the influence of the foreign policy 
of the home country.  The difference lies in the extension of the impact.  It affects the 
way we write.  There are some things we don’t dare to write about.” (Personal 
communication, 2014)  
 
Regarding the newsroom culture, the rotation system might be one of the most distinctive 
features of foreign correspondence. For staff or resident correspondents, the rotation system 
is intended to “avoid an excessive familiarity with the host culture, which might lead to a 
shift in the correspondent’s perception of news values” (Palmer & Fontan 2007). However, in 
reality, journalists cannot avoid forming emotional bond with the host culture and people. 
One interviewee from CCTV published a book on the customs and practices in the country he 
just left after five years; one female Xinhua journalist, who spent three years in Africa, shared 
her fond memories with the researchers.  Another one also expressed her wish to extend her 
work period if her application could be granted. In China, most central state media outlets 
implement the rotation system. Chinese journalists were assigned to a foreign bureau for two 
to four years based on their personal willingness/preference, language ability and the 
demands of the overseas bureaus. Experienced journalists are usually based in a foreign 
bureau for much longer. For instance, one of our interviewees was a resident correspondent in 
Israel twice for a total of 11 years, four years at one time and seven years at another time. 
Another interviewee worked in Syria three times for 12 years, about four years at a time. 
Small bureaus are usually staffed with one or two correspondents (occasionally a married 
couple).  
 
Normally based in the capital cities, Chinese correspondents maintain good relationship with 
the government of the host country and they receive protections from the military and the 
government.  They have developed a personal network of contacts and they are good at 
writing in-depth news analysis.  Since 2008, state media’s foreign bureaus, Xinhua in 
particular, increasingly hire local media workers, fixers and stringers to assist the resident 
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correspondents and to enhance the quality and quantity of news reporting.  The local 
employees, defined as “proxy journalists” and additional relay point in the process of 
mediated communication (Palmer & Fontan 2007), are able to get news fast and cover news 
stories in different forms and languages. Some of them are experienced journalists who used 
to work for other international news agencies such as BBC or CNN. This new practice, as 
part of the news agencies’ institutional reforms and expansion, is facilitated by the 
availability of financial resources, avoidance of dangers and risks for resident correspondents, 
and the competition with the Western media outlets.  
 
Within the organizations, many Chinese journalists believe relative freedom from the 
headquarters are the main advantages of their postings (Gagliardone & Pál 2016). Still 
conflicts and tensions often occur due to correspondents and editors’ different roles. While 
journalists tend to report what they see and hear on the spot, editors make sure the news 
copies conform to the editorial policies. For instance, a journalist claims: 
 
“I write as an observer. But editors may edit the articles based on their own thoughts 
or the instructions they have received from the Central Propaganda Department. 
Editors have their preferences and implement self-censorship” (ibid).  
 
In the time of clash between frontline reporters and newsroom editors, Zhang (2015) argues 
that objectivity is a value that Chinese correspondents use to justify their news coverage and 
their version of the truth. 
 
With Chinese government’s financial backing, the big four media (Xinhua, CCTV, People’s 
Daily, China Daily) are able to expand their overseas bureau around the world, send more 
journalists overseas, hire local employees and equip the bureaus and correspondents with 
advanced devices and technologies (Zhang, Wasserman & Mano 2016). Journalists start to 
call for institutional reforms.  One interviewee from Xinhua said, “In fact, what we need to 
change is the administrative management.  It should be flexible.  Currently everything, 
however small, goes to the leaders of the Agency.” (Personal communication, 2014) Yet the 
government’s allocation of US$6 billion to a few selected central state media looks unfair to 
other media outlets. “We are all in competition in the market economy,” said one 
correspondent from a central state newspaper. “For print publications, we have to make many 
more efforts to compete in the market.  News competition becomes fierce. In the past, the 
funding we received (at the branch bureau) was nearly the same as that of Xinhua.  Today 
Xinhua’s funding is ten times of ours.  They hire many more correspondents, both freelancers 
and local journalists.” (Personal communication, 2014) 
 
Practices 
As for news values in international news reporting, the current literature indicates a mix of 
positive reporting, focus of social significance, objectivity and balanced reporting. These 
values are tied with Chinese foreign correspondents’ roles, domestic situations, and 
professionalization. Wu and Ng (2011) revealed that the Chinese broadcasters no longer 
avoided news of a negative nature but still a larger percentage of the news events reported by 
CCTV-4 was positive rather than negative. They argue that Chinese journalists, as the 
government’s nation-building partners, use a harmony-oriented, supportive editorial stance in 
managing international news to project an image of a peace loving nation (ibid).  However 
Massey and Chang (2002) pointed out that Asian journalists tended to report positively on 
their home events but primarily use negative reporting in their coverage of international news 
events. Through examining Chinese correspondents in Africa, Gagliardone & Pál  (2016) 
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argue that the idea of positive reporting and China angle have been touted as distinctive of 
Chinese media but it has appeared difficult to operationalize. The coverage of conflicts and 
crises pursued by Chinese media in Africa does not seem to differ from that of their Western 
competitors. Based on her analysis of CCTV’s “Africa Live” and “Faces of Africa”, Zhang 
(2013) also argued that while “African News” does not follow the usual practice of 
prioritising positive reporting, the documentaries of “Africa Live” about African fashion and 
inspiring stories of support, sharing and love, not only effectively balance out the unusually 
negative reports on Africa in the news programme but also give a social and cultural 
perspective to the African narrative. 
 
Rather than focusing on the positive/negative dichotomy, Zhang, Shoemaker and Wang 
(2013) compared the news values of the USA and China in the coverage of international 
terrorism and found that Chinese journalists put more emphasis on perceptions of events’ 
social significance (political, social and pubic) than their American counterparts. They argued 
that Chinese newspapers cover fewer international terrorism events and domesticate 
terrorism-related news due to Chinese media’s lack of an extensive network of foreign 
correspondents overseas, emphasis of unity in Chinese culture, and China’s domestic ethnic 
tensions (ibid). For Chinese war reporting, Liang (2011) finds that in the Iraq War, Chinese 
news media such as CCTV international channel have changed their news format and applied 
news values such as “balanced reporting”. Zhang (2015) develops a term of Chinese-style 
pragmatic objectivity to mean that Chinese war correspondents use objectivity as a pragmatic 
value and a practical ritual to practice war journalism that does not involve China. 
 
As for the work routine, the acceleration of the news cycle and the arrival of digital 
technology started to challenge the routines and exclusivity of international reporting 
(Sambrook 2010). China is not an exception. Liang (2011) finds that CCTV introduced 
innovations in the coverage of Iraq War. Live studio interviews and the use of satellite 
transmission were adopted and routinized driven by competition, political environment and 
leadership. Zhang (2013) finds that digital technology influences Chinese correspondents in 
the war zones as they use micro-blogging in their daily routine and production processes, 
satellite phones and Google Earth as new reporting tools, as well as multi-platform reporting 
for the purpose of disseminating news to the widest audience and market branding. 
Meanwhile new media technologies also help overseas bureaus report in line with the centre 
in Beijing. For instance, CCTV Africa staff members have a daily online meeting and get 
detailed instructions as to how to report on an event or how to translate a word from Chinese 
into English (participant observation, 2012).   
 
News sources are particularly important for foreign correspondents that are non-natives 
without in-depth knowledge of the local society (Cheng & Lee 2015). Sources that 
correspondents often access include officials, experts, foreign diplomats, other journalists, 
members of the public or media sources (Archetti 2013). In China, Lin, Lo & Wang (2011)’s 
study finds that foreign news was mostly sourced from the head of states as well as other 
government officials. It is consistent with China’s political culture that the top leaders’ 
pronouncements always carry great weight and the roles of non-official, non-governmental, 
and grassroots voices are very limited. However, this research demonstrates that Chinese 
foreign correspondents do not solely rely on government officials.  Their news sources are 
diverse ranging from local employees, local media, international media, official channels, to 
personal friends. For overseas bureaus in different countries or regions, the sources 
journalists use might be different. One veteran correspondent from Xinhua based in 
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Damascus, Syria said his primary sources are local employees and other media. He 
commented: 
 
“Local employees are very well-informed. They have integrated in the news circle in 
Syria.  They know everything that happens. It is difficult for Chinese people to get 
into that circle.  Beyond that, I have personal friends for daily news reporting.  I keep 
an eye on local media, Syrian News Agency and a few big websites in particular.  
Xinhua and Syrian News Agency exchange news. Occasionally I read newspapers but 
I don’t use them as sources.  Western media including BBC, Reuters, AP, Al-Arabia 
as well as Al-Jazeera are must-reads.” (Personal communication, 2014) 
 
For correspondents based in Israel, official sources and local media are two main news 
sources. Interviewees claim they would register at the Foreign Correspondents Association 
and press offices upon their arrival in Israel.  These official organizations keep all 
correspondents updated in Hebrew and English on a daily basis via messaging services. News 
information from the official channels is extremely useful for journalists who can speak 
English only. Local media include Israeli radio and army radio, two English-language 
newspapers (Jerusalem Post and Harrats) and Quds from Palestine. Though the 
correspondents keep an eye on BBC and CNN, they believe “local media are much faster 
than the western media.” (Personal communication, 2012) 
 
As for constraints, Chinese correspondents have to deal with difficulties shared by foreign 
correspondents such as cultural barriers, lack of organizational support (Cheng & Lee 2015), 
home-office politics and national stereotypes (Hess 2005), as well as access to sources.  
Meanwhile they face particular institutional, organizational and personal obstacles: 
communicating a clear identity, competing with fast-growing and more professional national 
media, testing new styles (Gagliardone, & Pál 2016),  loosened political constraints (Liang 
2011), state foreign policies, military constraints, political orientations and editorial policies 
of news organizations, editorial procedures (censorship and self-censorship), and journalists’ 
personal experiences and values (see Zhang, 2015 for further discussions).  
 
News output 
 
Foreign correspondents play a critical role in news domestication process and they bring the 
relevant news information to the national audiences. Previous studies have addressed the 
news domestication and news framing of Chinese media in different world media events.  
Zhang, Shoemaker and Wang (2013) analyze the newspaper articles on terrorism and argue 
that terrorist events that are of high political significance are likely to translate into media 
coverage in China. Regarding the news coverage of the Arab Spring uprisings, Du (2016) 
finds that mainland Chinese media remained neutral toward the uprisings and the news 
framing emphasize the efforts of the governments to restore social stability. Those involved 
in the protests were framed as troublemakers. The role of the Internet and social media was 
rarely mentioned. Such framing is determined by the ideology and press system. Dai and 
Hyun (2010)’s framing analysis demonstrates that Xinhua domesticated and framed the North 
Korea nuclear issue by promoting a negotiation principle in solving the conflict.  National 
political interests impact the construction of frames as seen by Xinhua’s emphasis on the 
negative impact of the threat on China-North Korea’s former friendship. In another 
comparative discourse analysis involving China, Hayashi et al (2016) examine news coverage 
of the opening of 2012 London Olympic Games in five countries and discover divergent 
framing of the same event in relation to geopolitics and political ideologies. Chinese media 
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presented a negative image of London. The market-oriented Dragon TV was less 
propagandistic in its reporting, focusing on the events and athletes, whereas CCTV framed 
the Olympic Opening Ceremony as an opportunity for political diplomacy (Hayashi et al, 
2016).  Lastly, Zhang (2016) examined the news framing of People’s Daily and Global Times 
on conflicts in Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and Palestine-Israel. She concluded that different 
titles framed the conflicts differently in terms of focus, tone and use of languages. While the 
central media like People ’s Daily were more rigid in war reporting, the peripheral media like 
the Global Times were sensational and dramatic. The core ideology seemed to be anti-West 
in defiance of the hegemony of the US-led Western powers and the bias of the Western media 
and Al Jazeera. 
 
The afore-mentioned studies indicate that Chinese foreign correspondents and editors 
domesticate and frame significant news events that occur outside China in a particular way. 
News domestication and construction of frames are closely tied to China’s politics, 
diplomacy, national interests, ideology, growing power, nationalism and press system, which 
leads to bias in Chinese media’s reporting.  
 
News dissemination, reception and audience interactions 
 
Empowered by the digital technology, Chinese correspondents use multiple platforms to 
disseminate news to the widest audience and interact with audiences.  Their news reporting 
‘shapes audience reception and perception as much as it is shaped by them’ (Boyd-Barrett 
2004: 26). Foreign correspondents need to read media users’ reaction socially and politically.  
After all, how the media conceive of their audience will directly affect their media 
responsibilities and decision-making strategies (Wang, 2016). Our interviews reveal that 
Chinese correspondents hold three main attitudes towards the readers/audience and their 
reactions – responsive, skeptical, and indifferent.  
 
Responsive.  Some journalists perceive their role as interpreter and they employ subtle tactics 
to shorten the media-audience distance. One interviewee, while covering Palestine-Israel 
conflict, said: ‘This region (the Middle East) is far away from Chinese readers. Most readers 
are in a spectator’s mindset. They may not be very interested in where an explosion happens 
or what sets the fire…The most important thing is to explain what happens and what lies 
behind the conflict in succinct language.’ She continues: ‘We receive customers’ feedback 
after our news copies are released. The newsroom will contact journalists directly. Some 
customers, mostly media outlets, think we have the pro-Israel or pro-Palestine tendencies. 
Their judgement may not be accurate.  But customers are the foremost. Customers are God. 
Given their responses, we will make some adjustment.’  (Personal communication, 2012) 
Another veteran Israel-based journalist works at a national newspaper, which, according to 
him, targets at government organizations and intellectuals. He embeds meanings in his 
reports and lets the readers read between the lines and decode the meaning. ‘My reports are 
popular because I use a hidden and subtle writing style to write about something young 
journalists do not dare to. I present facts only but do not draw any conclusions. When people 
read it, they would smile and they know what is actually going on.’ (Personal 
communication, 2014). The quotes here suggest a tacit mutual understanding between 
journalists and readers.  
 
Skeptical. Journalists are skeptical about the audience’ demands for serious and significant 
news. A paradox exists between the high culture, high ideal of professional journalists and 
the perceived low culture, low standards, and low tastes of readers. A paradox also exists 
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between the truth the journalists cover and the truth readers want, recognize, or accept 
(Zhang, 2016:183).  In our interviews, a young journalist said the readers are biased and what 
he wants to cover and what the readers want to read are different. ‘There is a gap between 
documentary and news. For readers, the war and death become hot topics… The web users 
left comments on my photos. Their comments are biased. I have tried to do all-round 
coverage but the photos I take on normal days do not attract readers’ attentions. (Personal 
communication, 2014).  Here journalists’ skepticism and mistrusts towards audience are 
evident. According to Guo & Li (2011), since mass media are regarded as official apparatus, 
the Chinese audience ‘approach media content with skepticism and a readiness for critique’.  
In this sense, both journalists and readers are skeptical of each other and critical towards each 
other.  
 
Indifferent. Some journalists show little interest in the feedback of the audience. The central 
state media outlets are not market-oriented. They receive strong financial and policy backings 
from the government. Journalists want nothing but to get their job done. ‘We are like hens 
laying eggs. What people eat has nothing to do with us. People may dislike what I write but 
that is my job, a tool for me to make a living’. (Zhang, 2016:183). Another interviewee said 
she had no idea about audience’ reactions towards her reports. ‘We don’t keep in direct 
contact with the readers or netizens. Our influence is small. I don’t pay much attention to 
other people’s comments.  I just do my job.’ (Personal communication, 2014) 
 
Impacts 
 
Today central state media focus on becoming credible sources of information and opinion 
about the world, setting agendas rather than merely reacting to those set by the West 
(Gagliardone & Pál, 2016). The media-foreign policy relationship has become more 
interactive and symbiotic (Wang & Wang, 2014).  
 
Based on a case study about Sino-Japan relations, Wang & Wang (2014) argue that Chinese 
media, new media and social media in particular, helps shape the agenda for foreign policy 
makers, narrow down policy options, change the pace of policy-making and implementation, 
and influence the direction of the final decision. But the government still controls and 
regulates the reporting on foreign policy issues. Acknowledging the lack of transparency of 
the Chinese foreign policy-making process and the difficulty of obtaining data to study 
media–state relations, the two authors draw a tentative conclusion: the media is one of the 
domestic variables that could impact Chinese foreign policy (ibid).  
 
Our interviews also indicate the power imbalance between media and the foreign policy.  On 
one hand, Chinese correspondents’ coverage is indexed to and conforms to China’s foreign 
policies and positions. For instance, interviewees state that their news reporting is under 
direct influence of China’s foreign policy. 
 
‘We are not only journalists. We are Chinese in the first place. While doing 
interviews, we shall show the demeanor as Chinese journalists. Our news coverage in 
photography and print shall reflect China’s foreign policy.  We serve China’s foreign 
policy…Regarding the impact of China’s foreign policy, we are a Party newspaper.  
Frontline journalists can write whatever they want. But I am aware of the editorial 
principles back at home. So when I write, I do not sing a different tune (唱反调) too 
much.’ (Personal communication, 2014)  
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‘Xinhua News Agency is an official media outlet. Its reporting must conform to the 
state foreign policy. News reporting is also different from diplomacy.’ (Personal 
communication, 2014) 
 
‘Foreign policy is imposed in the post-production process. During the interviews, I 
can’t control or manipulate my interviewees. I have the tendency. For example, in 
Libya, I give more voices to the officials. I leave it to the editors to control (the news 
copy). Or when I am writing up, I deliberately elevate or emphasize certain details. It 
is an issue of balance. I highlight the China perspective through events thus to form a 
contrast with the West.’ (Personal communication, 2014) 
 
 
On the other hand, Chinese correspondents and news outlets influence China’s foreign policy 
in a more ‘hidden, internal, and institutional manner’ (Zhang, 2016: 93). Chinese 
correspondents impact China’s foreign policy by the means of internal reference (IR) (内参).  
IR refers to reports that are not written for mass media but for distribution among state 
leaders and state departments. Interviewees commented: ‘The only way we influence the 
policy making is that our news reports are included in the internal reference.’ ‘We often write 
IR. There is an IR division that puts together the opinions.’ ‘We all write IR. It is a bit deeper 
than the public copy.’ (Personal communication, 2014)  
 
Conclusion 
Employing the newly proposed framework and in-depth interviews in addition to literature 
review, we have revealed the identities, media cultures, journalistic practices, news outputs, 
media-audience relations and media-foreign policy relations in the digitalized and multilateral 
world. Findings show Chinese correspondents, while sharing many similarities with their 
western counterparts, keep distinctive features of their own.  
 
At the level of identities, there are more male than female correspondents who are in their 20s 
and/or 30s.  Many of them have resided in foreign countries for about 5 years.  They tend to 
be young, well-educated, fluent in English and probably another foreign language, and have a 
global and cosmopolitan outlook. A young journalist also has a good chance to work with a 
veteran at the outpost. They work on assignments at overseas bureaus out of fascination and 
excitement of the job, considerations for their career path, as well as the duty and ideal of 
being an international news reporter. Chinese correspondents perceive their roles as a mixture 
of observer and interpreter (professionally), information gatherer as well as diplomat and 
public diplomacy facilitator (politically).  
 
Regarding media cultures, with China’s journalism reform, news outlets, though state-owned, 
have transformed from serving the Party solely in the past to serving the Party and the local 
and global audiences today. The societal ideology and values emphasize social harmony, 
stability, partnership, and respect for authority. Historically Chinese foreign correspondents 
had the duty of serving national interests. With China’s foreign policy becoming more 
purposeful and assertive after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s “national interests” 
has expanded from security to include economic and individual citizens’ interests abroad. 
These interests and foreign policies are what the Chinese journalists uphold in their foreign 
news reporting. The organisational cultures feature rotation systems and home politics, which 
are similar to that of the Western media outlets. The difference is that the Chinese state media 
outlets, the recipients of government’s finances as part of the grand outward strategy, replace 
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the Western media and increasingly hire local employees in a foreign country or region, thus 
enhancing the quantity and quality of their news reporting.   
 
For journalistic practices, news values for Chinese correspondents range from positive 
reporting, China angle, focus of social significance, to adherence to the principles of 
objectivity and balanced reporting. The emphasis of “positivity” and “social significance” 
coincide with China’s dominant ideology and social values of “harmony”, “stability” and 
“unity”. Meanwhile existing studies also demonstrate the “negativity”, “objectivity” and 
“balanced reporting” in China’s coverage of crisis and conflicts overseas, which is no 
different from the Western media’s reporting. Chinese journalists’ work routine, news 
sources and constraints also share many similarities with their western counterparts. As Pan 
(2000) observes, Chinese journalists do not differ from their western counterparts in the work 
routines. What sets them apart are the political and economic factors defining the 
organizational settings and the macro environment for their activities.  
 
As far as news output is concerned, international news is domesticated and framed in a 
particular way conforming to China’s diplomacy, national interests and press system. 
Inwardly the news reporting style varies between the central state media and commercialized 
media.  While the central media outlets appear to be rigid in following the official guideline, 
market-oriented media outlets tend to be less propagandistic and more sensational.  
 
At the level of audience, as Chinese media have shifted their focus from leaders to readers, a 
new dynamic and dialectical relationship is formed between the media and audience. With 
the use of digital and social media, Chinese audience tend to choose more soft news rather 
than hard news and to get involved in agenda setting.  However, Chinese foreign 
correspondents hold mixed attitudes towards the audience, varying form responsiveness, 
skepticism to indifference.  It suggests that journalists from central media and domestic 
audience may have mutual understanding in certain scenario but in most cases they treat each 
other with skepticism and mistrust.   
 
Regarding impacts, the media-foreign policy relationship in China has changed from being 
static and top-down to being interactive and symbiotic but the power imbalance in media-
foreign policy relationship still exists. The state still controls and regulates international news 
reporting.  The new/social media seem to impact foreign policy process openly and publicly 
whereas mass media, foreign correspondents in particular, influence China’s foreign policy in 
a hidden, internal, and institutional manner.  
 
In conclusion, China’s particular press system and media cultures have defined and 
influenced the perceived roles, news values, news coverage of Chinese foreign 
correspondents as well as the media-audience and media-foreign policy relationships. The 
Chinese correspondents are learning from the western correspondents’ corps and become 
more professional. Meanwhile they maintain their own features and complexities. While the 
western foreign correspondence is retreating, Chinese central media and correspondents, 
bestowed by the government’s financial backing for media’s role in public diplomacy, are 
taking the opportunities to expand overseas bureaus, hire experienced local employees who 
used to work for western media, enhance the quantity and quality of international news 
reporting, use digital technologies in newsgathering and dissemination, and receive western-
style trainings. They all have implications for the Chinese media and correspondents in their 
confrontation with the challenge of “finding and communicating a clear identity” and “testing 
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new styles” (Gagliardone, & Pál, 2016) as well as building reputation, winning trust and 
increasing their influence in the contra global news flow.   
 
Future research on foreign correspondents in a cross-cultural context is needed to further test 
the newly proposed model. A mixture of quantitative and qualitative research methods such 
as online and offline questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews and digital 
ethnography can also be used.  Only with a systematic comparative analysis taking history, 
culture, practice, news output, media-audience and media-foreign policy into consideration 
can we truly understand the transformation of global press corps.  
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